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Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale,” (2003) working paper

By Rod Garratt and Thomas Tröger

Abstract

We show that in environments with independent private valuations a secondprice auction without reserve price can lead to an inefficient allocation of the good if resale is possible. Moreover, resale may either boost or reduce the initial seller’s revenues, depending on the prevailing equilibrium. A bidder with valuation zero can make substantial profits through resale.

Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.199.8008
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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