Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale,” (2003) working paper

By Rod Garratt and Thomas Tröger


We show that in environments with independent private valuations a secondprice auction without reserve price can lead to an inefficient allocation of the good if resale is possible. Moreover, resale may either boost or reduce the initial seller’s revenues, depending on the prevailing equilibrium. A bidder with valuation zero can make substantial profits through resale.

Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • (external link)
  • (external link)
  • Suggested articles

    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.