Location of Repository

Newcastle upon Tyne,

By  and Colin Wren and Colin Wren

Abstract

The paper analyses the existence and efficiency of discretionary industrial assistance schemes under asymmetric information between an uninformed government and a uniform distribution of firms with differing productivities. Discretionary assistance allows the government to scrutinise projects in an effort to learn the type, which can reduce the ‘informational rents ’ of automatic assistance, where firms take up any contract on offer. Two discretionary grant schemes are analysed, which either exclude ‘non-additional ’ projects or reduce the assistance to the minimum necessary for a project to proceed. The paper finds the conditions under which discretionary assistance exists and is more efficient than automatic assistance

Topics: Key Words, subsidies, asymmetric information, discretionary assistance, investment grants
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.198.9297
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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