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Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions: Technical Appendix.” UCLA Department of Economics Working Paper No

By Matthias Doepke and Robert M. Townsend

Abstract

In our paper “Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions,” we develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent models with hidden income and hidden actions. This appendix provides the detailed derivations of all recursive formulations presented in the paper, as well as proofs for all propositions

Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.198.8981
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