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Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace

By Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen

Abstract

This research was commissioned by Pact Sudan through the UK Department for International Development (DfID). The objective of the report was to provide evidence to inform key actors in Southern Sudan in consulting Southern Sudan's citizens and in designing, implementing and prioritising policies and activities that support peace and stability. Three research teams spent a month gathering data in Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, returning to Sudan during the 2010 elections. They conducted over 300 interviews, administered questionnaires, held drawing competitions in schools and ran participatory exercises with women, youths and elders. They found that despite great achievements, neither the Government of Southern Sudan nor the international agencies working there have achieved what they set out to do during the Interim Period. Accountable government structures on all levels, reliable service delivery, civic education, security and a coordinated effort among development agencies remain elusive goals

Topics: U Military Science (General), DT Africa
Publisher: Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:28869
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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Citations

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  80. In respect of the Southern Sudan, there shall be a Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), as per the borders of 1/1/56’ (CPA,
  81. INGO employee in report feedback session. Details and date withheld.
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  105. (2009). Interview with Respondent 2: Director of the Toposa Development Association. Narus:
  106. (2009). Interview with respondent 21: Diocese of Torit staff. Narus,
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  110. Interview with respondent 25: Bari chief. Kit,
  111. (2009). Interview with respondent 26: Acholi chief.
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  115. (2009). Interview with respondent 3: Fertit elder (name withheld).
  116. (2009). Interview with respondent 30: Acting Paramount Chief.
  117. (2009). Interview with respondent 35: veterinary officer (name withheld). Cueibet, Cuebeit County,
  118. (2009). Interview with respondent 36: county officials,
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  120. (2009). Interview with respondent 38: of civil affairs representative in UNMIS (name and title withheld).
  121. (2009). Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC official (name and title withheld).
  122. (2009). Interview with Respondent 4: UN officer (name, title and location withheld).
  123. (2009). Interview with respondent 40: priest.
  124. (2009). Interview with respondent 41: SPLA commander.
  125. (2009). Interview with respondent 42:
  126. (2009). Interview with respondent 43: NGO worker (name withheld).
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  128. (2009). Interview with respondent 46: SSRRC Field Officer. Upper Nile: 6
  129. (2009). Interview with respondent 47: local priest (name and church withheld). Raja Town:
  130. (2009). Interview with respondent 48: UN staff.
  131. (2009). Interview with Respondent 49: Correction services official (name and title withheld).
  132. (2009). Interview with respondent 5: Madi Elder. Nimule,
  133. (2009). Interview with respondent 50: Imam (name and mosque withheld).
  134. (2009). Interview with respondent 50: Reverend of Diocese of Torit.
  135. (2009). Interview with respondent 51: Chairperson of a Youth Peace-building Association. Aweil Town, Northern Bahr elGhazal: 5
  136. (2009). Interview with respondent 51: donor Democracy and Governance Officer (name and title withheld).
  137. (2009). Interview with respondent 53: Peacebuilding Officer/ INGO (name and title withheld). Aweil Town: 5
  138. Interview with respondent 54: Commissioner Aweil North. Gok Machar:
  139. (2009). Interview with respondent 55: INGO Country Director (name and title withheld).
  140. (2009). Interview with respondent 56: local man.
  141. (2009). Interview with respondent 57: Toposa Development Association Financial Advisor.
  142. (2009). Interview with respondent 59: international donor representative (name withheld).
  143. (2009). Interview with respondent 6: Woman leader (name withheld).
  144. Interview with respondent 60: advisor to Civil Affairs UNIMIS,.Torit:
  145. Interview with respondent 61: Speaker of the EES Interim Legislative Assembly.
  146. (2009). Interview with respondent 63: INGO Program Coordinator
  147. (2009). Interview with respondent 65: Local SPLM representative.
  148. (2009). Interview with respondent 66: local elder (name withheld).
  149. (2009). Interview with respondent 68: NGO representative.
  150. (2009). Interview with Respondent 7: Deputy Coordinator local peace-building NGO [name withheld].
  151. (2009). Interview with Respondent 70: Country Director/ Medical INGO (name and title withheld).
  152. Interview with respondent 71: INGO.
  153. (2009). Interview with Respondent 72: Field Coordination/ INGO (name and title withheld).
  154. (2009). Interview with respondent 73: Donor Coordinator/ Programme Manager (name and title withheld).
  155. Interview with respondent 9, Member of Council of Elders (name withheld),
  156. (2009). Interview with Respondents 58: Secretary General and Chairperson of local peacebuilding association. Aweil Town, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal: 5
  157. (2009). Interview with rspondent 64: INGO staff.
  158. (2009). Interview with SPLM officials (names withheld),
  159. (2009). Interview with UN officer (name and title withheld). Raja Town:
  160. (2009). Interview with UNMIS official (name withheld).
  161. it was reported that currently the SPLM’s support was diminishing and that this made a clear vote for secession less likely.
  162. (2009). Jur River County,
  163. (2009). local elder (name withheld). Bisselia,
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  166. (1930). Memorandum on Southern Policy’, Civil Secretary’s Office,
  167. (2009). NCP chairman Raja County. Raja Town:
  168. NGO respondents felt that with limited funding to Southern Sudan, NGOs needed to compete for funding which meant that they often worked in silos and lacked coordination.
  169. (1956). Omdurman/ Bergen: Abdel Karim Mirghani Cultural Center/ Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies,
  170. One reason for this is that funds are distributed from the centre through line ministries rather than through to the State leaving GoSS fully in charge of 70 per cent of the revenues and states only upwardly accountable to the president.
  171. (2007). one reason given for the MDTF’s slow disbursement is the rivalry between UNDP and the World Bank. See Axel Borchgrevink and Anita Haslie. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. ‘International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA, Working Paper 714’.
  172. (2007). One reportedly happened near the Ambororo camp in Lokol Okoni. Allegedly an argument between SPLA and Ambororo cattle traders ended in the Ambororo man stabbing the SPLA soldier to death. In
  173. particular ‘chiefs’ and ‘Kings’ with the most legitimate power and influence would not be in a position to abdicate their roles thus excluding the most influential traditional leaders from the executive and legislative governing of Southern Sudan.
  174. (2006). Peace has come to Southern Sudan, but challenges remain.’ doi
  175. (2009). per cent were for the North, now seems to be 50/50. It could be more if we were not cut off from the south but strong tribal links to the North and Darfur remain.’ Interview with Field Officer/INGO (name and title withheld). Raja Town:
  176. Personal email with feedback on Juba research workshop from respondent
  177. (2009). Personal email with feedback on Juba research workshop from respondent 20 (name withheld). 4
  178. (2009). Personal email with feedback on MTDT with respondent 69: World Bank staff (name withheld). 20
  179. (2009). Pigi belongs to Shilluk in Upper Nile not
  180. Please refer to the section on How decentralisation and administrative division fuels conflict, for a further discussion.
  181. pooled funding mechanisms make up 34 per cent of all donors funds whereas bilateral funding makes up 66 per cent.
  182. (2009). Presentation given by Aggrey Tisa Sabuni, Under Secretary, Planning, MoFEP, GoSS GoSS Aid Strategy: Current implementation & future challenges
  183. (2009). Questionnaire response from Madi returnee. Nimule,
  184. (2009). Raja attributed their continued marginalisation to the problem of ethnicity: ‘We feel the government in Wau is behind the delay in building the road because the Fertit are not ruling.’ Focus group discussion with women’s group. Raja Town, Raja County,
  185. reportedly 3000 guns were collected from members of Quart Salam, although it is not clear where these are stored. Interview with respondent 3: Fertit elder (name withheld).
  186. (2006). Rift Valley Institute. ‘Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline Study’.
  187. section ‘Chiefs’ and peacebuilding for a more detailed discussion on the current role of ‘chiefs’.
  188. (1985). See for example Andrew Mawson, ‘Murahaleen raids on the Dinka, doi
  189. (2008). See for example Mareike Schomerus, Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan’s Central and Eastern Equatoria (Working Paper 13). Human Security Baseline Assessment (Geneva: The Small Arms Survey,
  190. See for example, Daniel Awet Akot, ‘The imperative of decentralization,’ in Accord: Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts,
  191. See section on cattle for more on proliferation of cattle-raiding.
  192. (2008). Small Arms Survey. ‘Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North’.
  193. (2010). Small Arms Survey. ‘Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan’.
  194. so at least during that time, brideprice was not the main motivation for raiding.
  195. (2009). South Sudan asks to restore security to allow smooth voter registration,’ Sudan Tribune
  196. (2009). SPLM officials (names withheld).
  197. (1996). Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Mahmood Mamdani. (Princeton NJ: doi
  198. Taxation provides a good illustration: In some areas, collecting taxes has long been the chief’s role. As such, it was a localised process, often disconnected from a national authority or social contract with government.
  199. (1998). The ‘Wau Train’ was usually accompanied by several thousands of Misseriya on horseback. The movement of the train and the destruction caused by Misserya was largely stopped in
  200. The academic literature relating to identity politics and tribal conflicts in Sudan is substantial (recent contributions are Deng,
  201. (1953). The Azande, and related peoples of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Belgian Congo. doi
  202. The cattle-keeping areas visited for this research were Kapoeta East in Eastern Equatoria state,
  203. the Commissioner of Cueibet county,
  204. The consequences of this are expressed clearly in isolated areas, such as Raja County
  205. (2005). The corresponding map present in the British Library archives has no boundaries located lower than provincial level but rather only shows the demarcation between north and south. Furthermore, the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan
  206. The delicate balance between those supporting unity and those favouring separation was expressed in an interview with a local NGO worker who pointed out that ‘previously it was said that more than
  207. The first was the return of refugees to Algeria in the mid 1960s.
  208. (1964). The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology doi
  209. The militia worked in conjunction with SAF, including for intelligence gathering. When the SPLA entered Raja Town in 2001, Quart Salam fought with SAF to regain the town.
  210. (1997). The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan.
  211. (2010). the Resolutions.’ Paper presented at the Khorfulus and Atar Peace and Reconciliation Conference, Khorfulus, Jonglei State,
  212. (2009). The Resolutions’ (paper presented at the Khorfulus and Atar Peace and Reconciliation Conference, Khorfulus, Jonglei State,
  213. The revised Cotonou Agreement is the only binding legal instrument including an ICC-related clause.
  214. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. doi
  215. The rumours that guns are still being dropped for Quart Salam members were persistently mentioned between Mapel and Raja, along with rumours that Quart Salam was teaming up with the LRA.
  216. (2009). The term ‘ethnic tension’ was the term offered by the translator. Focus group discussion with focus group 7: main chief, Bai chief, Shat chief and head of parentteacher council. Korgana, Wau County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 31
  217. The term ‘peace dividend’ has come to mean any benefits associated with no longer being at war. Originally, however, the term referred to the re-allocation of funds from a no longer needed defense budget.
  218. These are results from individual interviews. A similar pattern emerged in focus group discussions.
  219. (2007). They also model themselves on Sudanese gangs prevalent in the refugee community in Cairo. Heather Sharp, ‘Sudanese gangs afflict Cairo streets ‘
  220. (2009). Thirty-three per cent of survey respondents reported that they had been attacked at least once since the signing of the CPA. Of those who reported having been attacked, 80 per cent said that the most recent attack had happened in
  221. This conflict set-up is mirrored in many places, such as in the conflict between Dinka Malual and Rizeigat.
  222. (1996). This distinction and its definition is derived from Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of late Colonialism, doi
  223. (2009). This point was made by groups interviewed along the road north of Nimule in
  224. This reversion to ‘tradition’ is often simply a throwback to reforms of another era rather than restoration of a somehow organic structure of society –see further discussion on chiefs in this report.
  225. (2009). three male members of Niggaz youth gang. Korgana, Wau County,
  226. Toposa males. Narus,
  227. (2009). Upper Nile:
  228. (2008). Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan’s Central and Eastern Equatoria (Working Paper 13). Human Security Baseline Assessment (Geneva: The Small Arms Survey,
  229. We are indebted to Douglas Johnson and John W Donaldson for their input into this section.
  230. Why Abyei Matters: the Breaking Point of Sudan’s doi
  231. (2005). Winning the war, but losing the peace? The dilemma of SPLM/A civil administration and the tasks ahead.’ doi
  232. (2009). Woman’s Group. Narus,
  233. (2005). Young credits Garang with keeping the SPLA/M alive and giving it a vision, while at the same time establishing a tight hegemony within the part.
  234. (2009). young, john. ‘Sudan: a flawed peace process leading to a flawed peace.’ Review of African Political Economy. 103, (2005): 99-113. young, j john. ‘Garang’s Legacy to the Peace Process, doi
  235. (2009). youth leaders in Bisselia.

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