Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation

By Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari

Abstract

In a one principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal’s interest if the agents supply substitutes. It can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed

Topics: delegation, hierarchy, intermediation, collusion
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.198.4724
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://econ.tau.ac.il/papers/e... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.