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Beliefs and Cooperation

By Bernardo A. Huberman and Natalie S. Glance

Abstract

Individuals in groups must often choose between acting selfishly and cooperating for the common good. The choices they make are based on their beliefs on how they expect their actions to affect others. We show that for a broad set of beliefs and group characteristics cooperation can appear spontaneously in non-cooperative groups after very long periods of time. When delays in information are unavoidable the group dynamics acquires a wide repertoire of behaviors, ranging from Social dilemmas have long attracted the attention of sociologists, economists and political scientists because they are central to issues that range from securing ongoing cooperation in volunteer organizations, such as unions and environmental groups, to the possibility of having a workable society without a government. Environmental pollution

Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.198.18
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