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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games

By Rafael Hortala-Vallve and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Abstract

We analyse a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities (i.e. the game is non-zero sum). We characterize the colonels. Payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty

Topics: HB Economic Theory
Publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:28693
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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