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The Review of Austrian Economics, 16:1, 63–75, 2003. c ○ 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Manufactured in The Netherlands. How Compatible are Public Choice and Austrian Political Economy?

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Abstract

Abstract. Public Choice relies heavily on equilibrium analysis in its models of government failure. Austrians are suspicious of equilibrium analysis owing to its reliance on some variant of the perfect-knowledge assumption. To what extent then can Austrians consistently embrace public-choice descriptions of government failure? This paper argues that to maintain methodological consistency Public Choice should jettison the equilibrium, perfectinformation framework, while keeping the empirically relevant assumption of narrow political interest. Key Words: Austrian political economy, public choice, radical ignoranc

Topics: JEL classification, D7, B53, L51
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.197.7353
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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