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By  and Richard T. Boylan and Richard T. Boylan

Abstract

The lobbying process has been described as an auction (see, for instance, Bernheim and Whinston [5]). The auction rules picked are supposed to be descriptive, however they vary from author to author. An optimal auction for a government o cial leads to the same policy as in [5], although contributions are di erent. A necessary condition for an auction to be optimal is that it allows contributions from the government ofcial to the lobby. The proof of these results depends on an extension of the work by Bernheim and Whinston [6] on implementation in environments with complete information. In particular all choice functions are Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium implementable when individuals preferences can be represented by quasi-linear utility functions bounded with respect to all variables { except for money. Keywords: lobbying, implementation, Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Numbers: C72, D72, D78

Topics: 3 An
Year: 1996
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.195.7393
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