Location of Repository

2004), The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees

By Winand Emons, Universität Bern and Nuno Garoupa

Abstract

Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a principal-agent framework where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort after she has observed the amount at stake. Contingent fees provide better incentives than conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are restricted to be non-negative or not. Under contingent fees the attorney uses her information about what is at stake more efficiently

Topics: contingent fees, conditional fees, moral hazard, incentives JEL, D82, K1 ∗We thank Alon Klement, Gerd Mühlheusser, Zvika Neeman, and Ralph Siebert for
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.195.5498
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://www-vwi.unibe.ch/theory... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.