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CHoice-Nash-equilibria

By J. C. R. Alcantud and Carlos Alós-ferrer

Abstract

We provide existence results for equilibria of games where players employ abstract (non-binary) choice rules. Such results are shown to encompass as a relevant instance that of games where players have (nontransitive) SSB (Skew-Symmetric Bilinear) preferences, as well as other well-known transitive (e.g. Nash’s) and non-transitive (e.g. Shafer and Sonnenschein’s) models in the literature. Further, our general model contains games where players display procedural rationality

Topics: non-cooperative games, non-binary choice, SSB preferences, procedural
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.194.4066
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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