Location of Repository

Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding

By Kshipra Bhawalkar and Tim Roughgarden

Abstract

We analyze the price of anarchy (POA) in a simple and practical non-truthful combinatorial auction when players have subadditive valuations for goods. We study the mechanism that sells every good in parallel with separate second-price auctions. We first prove that under a standard “no overbidding ” assumption, for every subadditive valuation profile, every pure Nash equilibrium has welfare at least 50 % of optimal — i.e., the POA is at most 2. For the incomplete information setting, we prove that the POA with respect to Bayes-Nash equilibria is strictly larger than 2 — an unusual separation from the full-information model — and is at most 2 ln m, wheremisthenumberof goods.

Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.193.9555
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://www.siam.org/proceeding... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.