Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives

By Claus Beisbart and Luc Bovens

Abstract

We consider a decision board with representatives who vote on proposals on behalf of their constituencies. We look for decision rules that realize utilitarian and (welfarist) egalitarian ideals. We set up a simple model and obtain roughly the following results. If the interests of people from the same constituency are uncorrelated, then a weighted rule with square root weights does best in terms of both ideals. If there are perfect correlations, then the utilitarian ideal requires proportional weights, whereas the egalitarian ideal requires equal weights. We investigate correlations that are in between these extremes and provide analytic arguments to connect our results to Barberà and Jackson (J Polit Econ 114(2):317–339, 2006) and to Banzhaf voting power

Topics: B Philosophy (General)
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2007
DOI identifier: 10.1007/s00355-007-0246-z
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:27914
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://www.springer.com/econom... (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27914... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.