ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: We would like to thank three referees for their very helpful comments,
By Gary Charness, Martin Dufwenberg, Geir Asheim, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Stefano Dellavigna, Tore Ellingsen and Shachar Kariv
Abstract
ABSTRACT: We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies & truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in the light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-from-blame
Topics:
Adverse selection, hidden information, participation, communication, cost-oflying, guilt-from-blame, psychological games, trust, cooperation, lies, deception, social preferences, behavioral economics
Year: 2010
OAI identifier:
oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.192.4650
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