Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games

By Klaus M. Schmidt and Jonathan P. Thomas

Abstract

Abstract: The paper analyzes reputation effects in general perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some positive prior probability that one of the players is committed to play the same (pure or mixed) action in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium payoff in all Nash equilibria. This bound is tight and independent of what other types have positive probability. It is generally lower than Fudenberg and Levine’s (1989, 1992) bound for games with a long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents. The bound cannot be improved by considering types playing history dependent commitment strategies

Topics: Reputation, Folk Theorem, repeated games, incomplete information
Year: 1996
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.192.4362
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://www.olin.wustl.edu/facu... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.