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Felix Oberholzer-Gee, David Strömberg, Jakob Svensson, two anonymous referees and participants

By Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, Gani Aldashev, Alessia Amighini, Ra Bonfiglioli, Thomas Eisensee, Giovanni Favara, Ro Riboni and Davide Sala


We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a sample of democracies, exploiting both cross country and time series variation in the data. Presidential regimes lead to smaller governments, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs. Different constitutions are also associated with different spending patterns over time and different cyclical response to income shocks. Some of these empirical regularities are in line with recent theoretical work; others still await a theoretical explanation. We are grateful for useful comments from Alberto Alesina, Tim Besley, Per-Anders Edin

Year: 2000
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