Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind (1996), it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem ’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness ’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjectivity and experience if we ignore intentionality, or do we not run the risk of thereby reinstating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores everything captured by the phrase »being-in-the-world«? In my article, I will inquire whether phenomenal consciousness and intentionality are two sides of the same coin that cannot be separated without committing a fallacy of division. In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question o
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