Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Perception, introspection and functional consonance

By John Dilworth

Abstract

Abstract What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a conforming belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be red to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be green to oneself instead. I offer some non-Cartesian, functionalist reasons supporting such an introspective certainty view, based on a concept of logical consonance of perceptual dispositions, according to which both experiencebased and belief dispositions cannot diverge in their content, on pain of their having inconsistent manifestations in relevant situations, such as color-sorting tasks. In addition, other views of introspection are criticized from the perspective of this consonance view. What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a conforming belief, i.e., a belief that

Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.188.9482
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://homepages.wmich.edu/%7E... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.