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Discussion Paper Series Expanding “Choice ” in School Choice

By Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Yeon-koo Che and Yosuke YasudaYeon-koo Che and Yosuke Yasuda

Abstract

Abstract: Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency. Keywords: Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto efficiency.

Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.183.8075
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