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Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization

By Yongmin Chen and Michael H. Riordan

Abstract

A vertically integrated firm has the incentive and ability to use exclusive contracts to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to effect a cartelization of the downstream industry. Its ability to do so may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized

Topics: JEL Codes, L1, L2 Keywords, vertical integration, exclusive dealing, cartelization, foreclosure Acknowledgement, The paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions of three anonymous
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.183.7755
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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