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Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

By Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui

Abstract

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions and shows that the sufficient conditions generalize the existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria

Topics: Key Words, incomplete information, potential, refinements, robustness
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.183.6809
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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