conflicts as non-zero-sum games, in which each side may choose to exercise or threaten violence in order to deter or incapacitate the opponent, or simply to exact revenge. It has been difficult, however, to test many of the predictions formulated by Schelling and others because of the lack of data on the strategic choices of the two sides engaged in a conflict, observed at a high enough frequency for statistical tests to have any power. This paper uses daily-frequency data to analyze the dynamics of violence during four years of the Second Intifada, the most recent outburst of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Violence in the Second Intifada (also known as the “al-Aqsa ” Intifada) claimed the lives of more than 4,100 Palestinians and more than 1,000 Israelis from its outbreak in September 2000 through May 2007. The conflict has often been characterized as a vicious cycle of vengeful violence from which it is impossible to escape. Violence by one side, however, may deter the opposite side from engaging in future violence, or could have an incapacitation effect, limiting the operational capability of the other side to carry out attacks. The question of whether military operations are effective and whether their timing is chosen strategically has been at the center of the public debate in Israel, but little serious and convincing evidence has been provided to settl
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