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Cheap-Talk with Incomplete Information on Both Sides

By Mor Amitai


We provide a characterization of the set of equilibria of two-person cheap-talk games with incomplete information on both sides. Each equilibrium generates a martingale with certain properties and one can obtain an equilibrium from each such martingale. Moreover, the characterization depends on the number of possible messages. It is shown that for every natural number n, there exist equilibrium payoffs that can be obtained only when the number of possible messages is at least n

Year: 1996
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