Adaptation to other initially unknown agents often requires computing an effective counter-strategy. In the Bayesian paradigm, one must find a good counterstrategy to the inferred posterior of the other agents ’ behavior. In the experts paradigm, one may want to choose experts that are good counter-strategies to the other agents ’ expected behavior. In this paper we introduce a technique for computing robust counter-strategies for adaptation in multiagent scenarios under a variety of paradigms. The strategies can take advantage of a suspected tendency in the decisions of the other agents, while bounding the worst-case performance when the tendency is not observed. The technique involves solving a modified game, and therefore can make use of recently developed algorithms for solving very large extensive games. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique in two-player Texas Hold’em. We show that the computed poker strategies are substantially more robust than best response counter-strategies, while still exploiting a suspected tendency. We also compose the generated strategies in an experts algorithm showing a dramatic improvement in performance over using simple best responses.
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