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Forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory. English Auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

By Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique and Alejandro M. Manelli

Abstract

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results

Topics: Key words, Auction Theory, International Trade, Monotone Comparative Statics, Global Univalence
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.160.6511
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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