Long-Run Welfare Effect of Energy Conservation Regulation


We investigate the long-run effect of energy conservation regulation, which forces firms to raise energy-saving investment above the cost-minimising level (i.e. the business-as-usual level). If Pigovian tax is imposed, additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition. However, under imperfect competition, additional regulation can improve welfare even if Pigovian tax is imposed. Thus, under imperfect competition, there is a rationale for additional energy conservation regulation even in the presence of Pigovian tax. Our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

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Munich RePEc Personal Archive

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oai::75626Last time updated on 7/9/2019View original full text link

This paper was published in Munich RePEc Personal Archive.

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