Article thumbnail

ADVERSE SELECTION AND REPUTATION SYSTEMS IN ONLINE AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY MOTORS

By James R. Wolf and Waleed A. Muhanna

Abstract

While the possibility of adverse selection is present in many transactional settings, online auctions appear to be especially susceptible to the problem. Unlike buyers in most traditional settings, online auction shoppers are physically unable to inspect the products for sale and must rely on pictures and descriptions provided by the seller. If buyers cannot distinguish quality until after the purchase has been made, there is no incentive for sellers to provide high quality products. As a result, buyers will be unwilling to pay a quality premium, the average quality in the market will decline, and the level of trade will fall to a level below what is socially optimal. Accordingly, if adverse selection exists in online auctions, the quality of items traded would be expected to be subaverage. In addition, we would expect the decreases in online prices to be larger than in offline prices as the variance in the condition of items increases. Using data from completed eBay Motors vehicle auctions, we test both assumptions and examine the ability of online reputation systems to offset the effects of adverse selection. Our results suggest that adverse selection is more pronounced in online auctions compared to traditional marketplaces for used goods, and that reputation systems reduce, but do not fully eliminate, the problem. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that as vehicle age and mileage increase (i.e., as the varianc

Topics: Electronic markets, online auctions, information asymmetry, reputation systems When sellers have better product quality information than potential buyers, this information asymmetry ca
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.139.2159
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.