Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Strategic risk, civil war and intervention

By Gerard Padro i Miquel


This paper presents a theory of con°ict in which violence occurs as a result of strategic risk. Actors face a di±cult balancing act between the fear of being attacked and the opportunity cost of breaking peace that selects the risk dominant equilibrium. We link the propensity of con°ict to current and future economic conditions and dis- cuss the e®ects of growth, inequality and military technology on the ability of groups to escape the Security Dilemma

Topics: HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
Year: 2007
OAI identifier:
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • (external link)
  • (external link)
  • Suggested articles

    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.