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Interpreting histories without common language: Coordination in Sender-Receiver Games

By P. Février, F. Kramarz, Stéphane Gregoir, Sergiu Hart, Thomas Palfrey, Bernard Salanié and More Particularly


This paper studies the communication in repeated common interest Sender-Receiver games when no common language is available to the players. The history of the game (i.e. the succession of actions and messages chosen by the players) constitutes the unique source of structure that can be used by the players to communicate. We are interested in understanding how the receiver can interpret a history to play the optimal action. We define several axioms that a “good” interpretation should satisfy. These axioms explicitly use symmetries and asymmetries of a history to impose restrictions on the interpretation. Our set of axioms characterize a unique “good ” interpretation. In the spirit of Crawford and Haller (1990), we relate our interpretation function to attainable strategies. If players use optimal attainable strategies and if they care enough about future gains, a common language comprising the two words “yes ” and “no ” emerges. Keywords: Coordination, Sender-Receiver games, Interpreting histories

Topics: Language
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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