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Pre-strike ballots and wage-employment bargaining

By Alan Manning

Abstract

This paper attempts to construct a model of the economic effects of the introduction of pre-strike ballots in Britain in the Employment Act (1984). It argues that strike ballots tend to reduce union influence over issues which affect different workers in different ways (like plant closures) and will do little to alter union influence over issues which affect workers similarly (like wages). The effect is that compulsory ballots may reduce employment and do little to reduce wages. The robustness of this result is explored in a number of models. An alternative legal framework is also suggested

Topics: HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 1991
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:21126
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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