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Competitiveness via Consensus

By Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline

Abstract

We introduce Consensus Revenue Estimate (CORE) auctions. This is a class of competitive auctions that is interesting for several reasons. One auction from this class achieves a better competitive ratio than any previously known auction. Another one uses only two random bits, whereas the previously known competitive auctions on n bidders use n random bits. A parameterized CORE auction performs better than the previous auctions in the context of mass-market goods, such as digital goods. The improved performance is due to the consensus estimate technique that allows more information to be extracted from the input. This technique is very natural and may be useful in other contexts

Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.134.8541
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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