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Subjective Equilibria in Interactive POMDPs: Theory and Computational Limitations

By Prashant Doshi and Piotr Gmytrasiewicz


We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents engaged in a infinite horizon partially observable stochastic game formalized by the interactive POMDP framework. We show that when agents ’ initial beliefs satisfy a truth compatibility condition, their behavior converges to a subjective ɛ-equilibrium in a finite time, and subjective equilibrium in the limit. Imposing an additional assumption of mutual singularity on agents ’ initial beliefs makes their behavior converge to Nash equilibrium. While theoretically sound, the equilibrating process is difficult to demonstrate computationally because of the difficulty in coming up with initial beliefs that satisfy the truth compatibility condition.

Year: 2009
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