Location of Repository

Political competition and pork-barrel politics in the allocation of public investment in Mexico

By Joan Costa-i-Font, Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia and Dario Lunapla

Abstract

This paper examines theeffect of political competition in localelections in regional allocation of publicinvestment. The study employs data onMexican elections covering the period 1990–95, characterisedby an increase in electoral competition and coupled withincreasing demands for decentralisationthroughout the states. Empirical evidencesupports the hypothesis that regionalallocation of public investment by centralgovernment was driven by `politicalopportunism'' and `local pork-barrelpolitics''. A positive relationship wasfound between the regional allocation ofpublic investment and support for thecentral ruling party. This might indicatethat local spending inefficiencies werepartially explained by the specific supportfor the incumbent party

Topics: JA Political science (General)
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Year: 2003
DOI identifier: 10.1023/A:1024263208736
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:19936
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://www.springer.com/econom... (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19936... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.