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Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in

By Oliver Hart and John Moore

Abstract

We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are "ruled out". Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the list are not "ruled out". A "loose" contract (long list) maximizes flexibility but may interfere with ex ante investment incentives. When these incentives are important enough, the parties may write a "tight" contract (short list), even though this leads to ex post inefficiency

Topics: HD Industries. Land use. Labor, K Law (General)
Publisher: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:19316
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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