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The core executive's approach to regulation: from 'better regulation' to 'risk-tolerant deregulation'

By Anneliese Dodds

Abstract

This article examines changes in the New Labour core executive's approach to regulation and its relationship with risk, through analysing documentary, legislative and press sources concerning approaches to regulatory decision-making. It claims that an initial commitment to ‘better regulation’ has gradually been replaced by explicit support for deregulation. A reduction in the scope of regulation was also promoted by the Thatcher and Major governments. The New Labour core executive shares previous (Conservative) administrations’ concern to include business in deregulatory decision-making. However, the article claims that there is one significant difference in the New Labour deregulatory approach: a new toleration of risk. Deregulation is, now, described as a corrective to regulators’ over-reactions to perceived risks, which, it is claimed, are holding back economic and technological progress. However, this new approach excludes competing views concerning how risk should be regulated. In particular, it does not engage with widespread popular views that governments should continue to protect against risk

Topics: JA Political science (General), JN101 Great Britain
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Year: 2006
DOI identifier: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2006.00503.x
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:15382
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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