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Contested meanings of transparency in central banking

By Iain Begg

Abstract

Over the last two decades, there have been far-reaching transformations in the ways central banks operate, especially in regard to how openly they communicate with other actors. Transparency in central banking has two quite distinct motivations. The first is to provide a means of holding the central bankers to account, while the second is about the efficiency of their policy-making. These two motivations for transparency reflect contestable norms about the choices central banks make. The paper discusses how transparency in central banking functions and explores how the underlying norms might be open to contestation. A typology showing the rationale for, and effects of, different forms of transparency is constructed and its implications assessed

Topics: HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2007
DOI identifier: 10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110100
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:14951
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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