A new political environment and constitutional reforms have enabled the Polish executive to overcome communist legacies; but its capacity to shape policy remains checked by significant systemic, political and organizational constraints. Within the political system, the core executive is constrained by presidential veto powers and parliamentary activism. Successive governments have been dominated by their supporting parties. Internally, the core executive has been constrained by limited political and organizational resources available to the prime minister, the problematic design of the Chancellery and weakly developed instruments for political co-ordination. While a restricted policy-shaping capacity of the executive may have ensured additional legitimacy for systemic reforms during early stages of democratic transition, it also contributes to defective policy choices and executive impotency, as is demonstrated by the failure of income tax reform during the late 1990s. There is some evidence to suggest, however, that the Polish executive is likely to tighten its grip on public policy-making in future
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