Location of Repository

Computationally efficient coordination in game trees

By Francoise Forges and Bernhard von Stengel

Abstract

The solution concept of “correlated equilibrium” allows for coordination in games. For game trees with imperfect information, it gives rise to NP-hard problems, even for two-player games without chance moves. We introduce the “extensive form correlated equilibrium” (EFCE), which extends Aumann’s correlated equilibrium, where coordination is achieved by signals that are received “locally” at information sets. An EFCE is polynomial-time computable for two-player games without chance moves

Topics: QA Mathematics
Publisher: Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:13541
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://www.cdam.lse.ac.uk (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/13541... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.