Location of Repository

Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies

By Bernhard von Stengel and Schmuel Zamir

Abstract

A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the same payoffs, where one player commits to a strategy to which the second player chooses a best reply. This paper studies such leadership games for the mixed extension of a finite game, where the leader commits to a mixed strategy. The set of leader payoffs is an interval (for generic games a singleton), which is at least as good as the set of that player’s Nash and correlated equilibrium payoffs in the simultaneous game. This no longer holds for leadership games with three or more players

Topics: QA Mathematics
Publisher: Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:13338
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://www.cdam.lse.ac.uk (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/13338... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.