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Preference change and interpersonal comparisons of welfare

By Alex Voorhoeve

Abstract

Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being

Topics: B Philosophy (General)
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:9369
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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