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Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio

By Tommaso Valletti and Andrea Prat

Abstract

Economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning the spectrum works better than other allocation methods, such as beauty contests. As well as raising revenues, a well-designed auction assigns licences to the operators best able to use them. Auctions can also be designed to advance public-policy goals. In this paper, we discuss some common misunderstandings about auctions. We also consider the need for asymmetric regulations for the next generation of mobile services in terms of bandwidth, roaming and coverage constraints

Topics: HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Societa Editrice Il Mulino
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:5255
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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