Location of Repository

An economic analysis of campaign finance

By Andrea Prat

Abstract

Electoral campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic model of campaign finance, which could be used for policy evaluation. At the core of the model lies an asymmetry of information between lobbies and voters. Lobbies know more than voters about the quality of candidates. Campaign contributions constitute an indirect way to reveal lobbies’ information to voters. However, this informational benefit comes at the cost of candidates deviating from the median voter’s preferred policy in order to attract higher contributions

Topics: HG Finance
Publisher: NTC Publications Ltd
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:5249
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://www.world-economics-jou... (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5249/ (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.