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Asset price dynamics when traders care about reputation

By Amil Dasgupta and Andrea Prat

Abstract

What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market where traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to study a financial market with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally efficient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an infinite sequence of trades. This finding, which stands in sharp contrast with the results for standard financial markets, is due to the fact that our traders face an endogenous incentive to behave in a conformist manner. We show that there exist equilibria where career-concerned agents trade in a conformist manner when prices have risen or fallen sharply. We also show that each asset carries an endogenous reputational benefit or cost, which may lead to systematic mispricing if asset supply is not infinitely elasti

Topics: HG Finance, HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:5210
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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