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Decision–making procedures for committees of careerist experts

By Gilat Levy

Abstract

The article focuses on the effect of transparency of committees on committee member voting. Proponents of transparency emphasize the benefits of enhanced accountability and predictability, as well as the provision of expert information to the economy. Political scientists and economists both note that transparency can yield inefficient decisions as decision makers start hiding their private views in public. This would distort the process of information aggregation. The article also states that committee members would vote depending on the popular sentiment concerning the decision, rather than what they feel is right or wrong

Topics: HB Economic Theory
Publisher: American Economic Association
Year: 2007
DOI identifier: 10.1257/aer.97.2.306
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:4817
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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