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Truncated differential analysis of reduced-round LBlock

By Sareh Emami, Cameron McDonald, Josef Pieprzyk and Ron Steinfeld

Abstract

In this paper we present truncated differential analysis of reduced-round LBlock by computing the differential distribution of every nibble of the state. LLR statistical test is used as a tool to apply the distinguishing and key-recovery attacks. To build the distinguisher, all possible differences are traced through the cipher and the truncated differential probability distribution is determined for every output nibble. We concatenate additional rounds to the beginning and end of the truncated differential distribution to apply the key-recovery attack. By exploiting properties of the key schedule, we obtain a large overlap of key bits used in the beginning and final rounds. This allows us to significantly increase the differential probabilities and hence reduce the attack complexity. We validate the analysis by implementing the attack on LBlock reduced to 12 rounds. Finally, we apply single-key and related-key attacks on 18 and 21-round LBlock, respectively

Topics: Block cipher, LBlock, Truncated differetial analysis, Probability distribution, Log-likelihood ratio, Key-recovery attack
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Year: 2013
DOI identifier: 10.1007/978-3-319-02937-5_16
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.qut.edu.au:69383
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