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Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests

By Christian Ewerhart

Abstract

Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 < R < ∞") has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being "halfhearted," which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed, and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction

Topics: Department of Economics, Department of Economics, 330 Economics, Tullock contest, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, analytical functions
Year: 2014
DOI identifier: 10.5167/uzh-93905
OAI identifier: oai:www.zora.uzh.ch:93905
Provided by: ZORA

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