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Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy

By Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Positive and normative issues are analysed. On the positive side, lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes, because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences. On the normative side, coordination failure among lobbyists can result in Pareto inefficient policy choices. In addition, by creating rents to holding office, lobbying can lead to 'excessive' entry into electoral competition

Topics: JC Political theory, HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
Publisher: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 1997
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:2104
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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