Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

An economic model of representative democracy

By Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate

Abstract

This paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy-making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office. The approach has a number of attractive features. First, it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by, as well as of, the people. Second, the model is analytically tractable, being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally. Third, it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

Topics: HB Economic Theory, JC Political theory
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 1997
DOI identifier: 10.1162/003355397555136
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:1276
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/1276/ (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.