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Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

By Andrew M. Colman, Tom W. Körner, Olivier Musy and Tarik Tazdaït


The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.Peer-reviewedPost-prin

Topics: Altruism, Berge equilibrium, Common interest game, Cooperation, Coordination game, Payoff dominance, Prisoner’s dilemma, Social dilemma, Social value orientation, Team reasoning
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2011
DOI identifier: 10.1016/
OAI identifier:

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