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Ambiguity aversion in the long run: Repeated decisions under risk and uncertainty

By Hsin-Hsien Liu and Andrew M. Colman


In two experiments, decision makers chose between risky and ambiguous gambles under conditions of both single (unrepeated) and multiply repeated choices. The gambles were presented either as modified Ellsberg urn choices or as marketing strategy decisions. In both experiments, decision makers chose the ambiguous options more frequently in the repeated-choice than the single-choice conditions. More decision makers made risky single choices and ambiguous repeated choices than ambiguous single choices and risky repeated choices. Decision makers expressed more self-rated confidence in their repeated than their single ambiguous choices. These findings are interpreted in the light of findings on repeated decision making under risk and theories of loss aversion and ambiguity aversion

Topics: Ambiguity aversion, Ellsberg paradox, Loss aversion, Repeated decisions, Risk aversion
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2009
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.joep.2009.02.001
OAI identifier:

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